Economist Jeffrey Sachs argued in an interview with Firstpost that India should leave the Quad as the grouping belongs to a fading era, serves no useful purpose in India's security, and damages India's relations with China.
Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that India should leave the Quad and instead focus on forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Brics.
Since it’s revival more than a decade ago, the four member states —India, the United States, Australia, and Japan— have invested significant energy in the initiative.
But, in an interview with Firstpost's Mohd Saif, Rajat Mishra, and Madhur Sharma, Sachs said the grouping belongs to a fading era, serves no useful purpose in India's security, and damages India's relations with China, which he argued are enormously important to the future of both countries.
Sachs portrayed the India-China relationship as a force for global good. He suggested that India attract Chinese investment and establish joint ventures with Chinese companies to expand its manufacturing base and strengthen its research and development capabilities.
"If India and China settle their differences and strengthen their relations, the whole world will benefit. India should hold a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. I would very much like China to endorse India’s permanent membership, and for that to happen, relations between China and India should be positive, cooperative, and stable," said Sachs, University Professor and Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University.
Sachs also spoke about the future of America's role in the world, Asean and the Indo-Pacific, the conflict in West Asia, and the artificial intelligence boom that many fear is a bubble waiting to burst. Here is the full interview.
With PM Modi attending the Asean Summit in the Philippines, there's a lot of interest among Indians in the meeting. But there is also a concern: is Asean losing its centrality in the Indo-Pacific as US-China rivalry intensifies? Can it preserve its strategic autonomy, and what role can India play in the region to stabilise the security situation?
Asean is navigating effectively, and I believe its centrality is secure. Asia is returning to the center of the world economy, where it stood for most of recorded history. Asia’s share of world output has risen from around 20 per cent in 1950 to roughly 50 per cent today, and ASEAN sits at the crossroads of Asia’s largest economies, including China, India, Japan, and Korea.
China is Asean’s largest trading and investment partner, with two-way trade approaching a trillion dollars a year, roughly twice Asean’s trade with the United States. All of Asean’s members understand that reality. It is a matter of size, since China’s economy is about one-third larger than the US economy when measured at purchasing-power parity, and of proximity. The United States cannot stop Asean’s closer economic relations with China even if it tried, and both its interest and its ability to do so are diminishing. In fact, I believe that Trump is reducing the anti-China posture of the United States, since Washington has learned that it cannot win a trade war or a hot war with China. His meeting with President Xi in Shenzhen next week is a sign of that.
Asean’s strategic autonomy rests on refusing to choose sides, which it has done skillfully for decades through the East Asia Summit, the Asean Regional Forum, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. India, in my view, should join RCEP, deepen trade and investment with Southeast Asia, build connectivity across the Bay of Bengal through the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway, and strengthen the Asean-led forums in which India, China and the United States all sit together.
With the first Quad leaders' summit in two years expected in the Philippines, how do you see the group shaping up and alignment with its geopolitical priorities? Is the Quad emerging as an effective strategic grouping or becoming an instrument of China-containment strategy? From India's perspective, there are some who argue that the Quad needs India more than India needs the Quad. What's your assessment?
India should leave the Quad. It plays no useful role in India’s security, and it damages India’s relations with China, which matter enormously to both China’s and India’s future. Whatever its communiqués say about a free and open Indo-Pacific, the Quad was conceived in Washington as an instrument of China containment, and the fact that its leaders have not met in two years shows how marginal it has become.
In 2025, the United States imposed tariffs of 50 per cent on Indian goods, in part to punish India for buying Russian oil. That is not how a partner behaves. The Quad needs India much more than India needs the Quad, since without India the Quad is simply the United States and two of its treaty allies. But that is a reason for India to step away, not a source of leverage.
The deeper point is that the Quad belongs to a fading era. The United States is overstretched and is already pulling back from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, as US voters showed in this month’s midterm elections when they repudiated the war on Iran. India should not tie its security to a strategy of US primacy that Americans themselves are abandoning. India’s security is best served by a settled border with China and by strong economic ties across Asia, and the Quad offers neither. The forums that matter for India’s future are those that include China, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Brics, and the East Asia Summit.
US President Donald Trump, China's Xi Jinping, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin are expected to hold an unprecedented trilateral meeting in China. Could this reshape the global power equation? Do you see it ending the Ukraine war or stabilising the West Asia situation?
I hope that it ushers in a period of calmer relations among the three. The trilateral meeting in Shenzhen, on the sidelines of the APEC summit on November 18 and 19, will be the first of its kind, and its stated focus is nuclear arms control. That is urgent.
The New START treaty expired on February 5, leaving the United States and Russia without any limits on their strategic nuclear forces for the first time since 1972. Russia has said that it will keep to the treaty’s limits if the United States does the same. That offer should be accepted and turned into a new treaty, with China and others brought into a broader process. The three leaders should also certainly agree to keep AI out of nuclear command and control.
Iran will also be discussed, with the Strait of Hormuz still largely closed. I do not expect a single meeting to end the Ukraine war or to stabilise West Asia, and the White House has said that Ukraine is unlikely to be on the agenda. Yet regular consultation among the great powers is the foundation of a stable world order.
India should be included in regular four-way meetings with the United States, China, and Russia. India is the world’s fourth superpower, and no stable global order, including on nuclear arms control, can be built without it.
Alas, India is not yet part of APEC. India should become part of APEC and should also reverse its 2019 decision to stay out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest trade agreement. India would benefit enormously from membership in RCEP.
How do you see the unravelling of Jensen Huang episode and the damage that Nvidia has suffered? Do you see it slowing down the AI boom?
Whether this episode slows the AI boom matters less than the larger point. The AI frenzy needs to be calmed down in any event. The technology needs responsible governance and does not yet have it. The leading AI developers themselves warn investors that their models could pose catastrophic risks to humanity, yet in the United States the only response so far has been a voluntary and non-binding set of commitments signed at the White House in September, which amounts to self-regulation, and self-regulation is tantamount to no regulation.
The US Big Tech companies are racing ahead recklessly, dazzled by trillions of dollars in stock market value. It is a stock market bubble that will burst.
More importantly, we need cooperation to control the technology and limit its hazardous side effects. The usual objection is that if the United States slows down, China will race ahead. This is a standard collective-action problem, and such problems are solved by multilateral agreements backed by monitoring and enforcement. Frontier AI even offers a natural point of verification, since the most advanced chips come from a handful of factories and frontier training requires enormous data centers. Yet after his summit with President Xi in September, President Trump again rejected cooperation with China on AI. The major powers should negotiate a verifiable agreement on frontier AI.
Is AI a financial bubble? Could the massive investments in AI infrastructure trigger a financial crisis if commercial returns fail to match expectations? Are we witnessing a genuine technological revolution or an investment bubble, and what would its collapse mean for the global economy?
We are witnessing both a technological revolution and an investment bubble. The two have gone hand in hand throughout history, from the British railway mania of the 1840s to the internet boom of the late 1990s. The internet arrived exactly as promised, yet Cisco, the indispensable supplier of the internet build-out in March 2000, thereafter lost six-sevenths of its value.
The US stock market today stands at valuations reached only twice before in the past century and a half, in 1929 and in 2000. Shiller’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands above 40, against a historical median of about 16, and the value of the US stock market has reached well over twice U. GDP, far above its peak in the dot-com bubble. Seven companies are worth some $23 trillion, about a third of the S&P 500, and they are spending around $700 billion this year on chips and data centers in competition with one another for the same future revenues.
Those valuations are a wager that AI will allow a handful of firms to capture a large share of the rich world’s wage bill at monopoly margins. In every earlier technological revolution, the gains went mainly to the users of the technology, not to its initial suppliers. This is likely to be true once again in the case of AI since Chinese companies are offering many of their advanced models on an open-weight basis.
The collapse of the bubble will probably mean a few years of financial distress in the US economy. A return of valuations merely to their historical averages would erase $30 to $40 trillion of paper wealth. Since the top fifth of households account for well over half of US consumer spending, falling share prices would quickly mean falling consumption, and the federal deficit, already six to seven percent of GDP at full employment, could rise markedly. The losses would also spread abroad, since foreigners own about $20 trillion of US equities, much of it in the pension savings of Europe. The emerging economies are less exposed, because their growth was never based on Wall Street.
Canadian PM Mark Carney wants to reduce his country's economic dependence on the US. Does this open a strategic opportunity for India given the anticipation that PM Modi's upcoming Canada visit may see the signing of a major trade deal? Also, can Canada satiate India's quest for dependable supply of critical minerals, energy and new technology despite recent tensions?
Canada is trying to diversify its trade away from heavy dependence on the United States, which still buys roughly three-quarters of Canada’s exports. India should diversify as well. The India-Canada trade relationship will never be central to India’s economy — Canada is too small and too far away for that to be the case. But Canada is a responsible trading partner and therefore a worthy trade partner for India.
A comprehensive economic partnership agreement, which the two governments hope to advance when Prime Minister Modi visits Canada in December, would make good sense. Canada has much of what India can use well: potash for fertiliser, uranium for India’s nuclear power program, critical minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt, and strong universities and research institutions. India in turn offers Canada a large and fast-growing market, and a large Indian diaspora links the two societies.
Both countries would do well to put the political tensions of recent years behind them and to focus on these complementary interests. Canada’s turn away from overdependence on Washington is itself a sign of the times. Even America’s closest neighbor and ally is hedging against a United States whose trade policies and geopolitics have become unpredictable.
Countries are increasingly worried about their dependence on both the US and China. Is the world moving towards a fragmented trading system? Can India's trade agreements with the EU, UK and Canada help it emerge as a significant alternative in global supply chains?
It is more accurate to say that the world trade system is rebalancing. The United States is retreating from its dominant position in the world, pulling back from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, and using tariffs in ways that have undermined the trading system it largely built.
The United States now produces about 14 per cent of world output measured at purchasing-power parity, and the emerging and developing economies about 60 per cent. The rest of the world continues to trade and to integrate. India’s agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union and Canada are useful, though India’s greatest opportunities lie closer to home. India should focus on good relations with its Indian Ocean trade partners in Africa, West Asia, and Southeast Asia, and with China. These are among the fastest-growing regions of the world economy, and they are India’s natural trade partners.
If India wants to become a real alternative in global supply chains, it must raise its share of manufacturing, which has barely changed in three decades. That requires a far stronger innovation effort, since India spends only about 0.7 per cent of GDP on research and development, roughly a quarter of China’s rate, and advancing innovation will benefit enormously from joint ventures with Chinese firms.
Every successful East Asian industrialiser, from Korea and Taiwan to Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, grew through joint ventures with the leading regional manufacturers of its time. India’s own Economic Survey of 2024-25 recommended reconsidering the restrictions on Chinese investment imposed in 2020. A published framework that permits joint ventures with Chinese firms in electric vehicles, batteries, solar manufacturing and electronics, with Indian co-ownership and technology transfers, would significantly accelerate India’s industrialization, and benefit both China and India.
If India and China settle their differences and strengthen their relations, the whole world will benefit. India should hold a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. I would very much like China to endorse India’s permanent membership, and for that to happen, relations between China and India should be positive, cooperative, and stable. The thaw that began with Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in 2025 is an important re-start.
Moving to West Asia tensions, which saw a weaponisation of global trade. Is America's security umbrella in the Gulf beginning to weaken? Are Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar starting to look towards China and other powers for security guarantees? What does this mean for India's strategic and energy interests in the region?
The United States in general has lost much of its relative power, as technology, production, and military capacity have diffused more widely. The Iran war made this plain.
After the United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28, Iranian high-tech missiles and drones struck targets in six Gulf states and Jordan, including the Ras Tanura refinery in Saudi Arabia and US bases across the region. The US bases across the Gulf did not bring security in this war. They turned their host nations into targets. The US strategy of casting Iran as the region’s permanent enemy, and inviting the Arab states to shelter under American power, has brought the region to war and great economic loss.
The Gulf states are now drawing their own conclusions. In August, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. Qatar has called for a regional dialogue, and Qatar, Pakistan and Oman have kept channels of mediation with Tehran open throughout the war. The Gulf states also continue to deepen their ties with China, which brokered the Saudi-Iran reconciliation in 2023.
The United States cannot be the guarantor for the Gulf countries, or for Ukraine, or for countries in East Asia. In every part of the world, the security architecture should be regional and not depend on the United States or some distant great power. We are past that phase of history. For the Gulf, that means a standing regional security framework that includes Iran as well as the Arab states, built on mutual non-aggression, freedom of navigation, and a zone free of nuclear weapons. For India, the Gulf is home to some nine million Indian workers and a major source of its oil and gas. India, with good relations on all sides, is well placed to support such a framework and should do so actively.
Could the next global economic crisis originate in the geopolitical vulnerabilities of the Gulf rather than on Wall Street or in China? How serious is the threat posed by instability around the Strait of Hormuz, energy infrastructure and international shipping to India's energy security and the global economy?
Yes, a renewed war in the region could stoke a dire global crisis, and in part it already has.
Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried about a fifth of the world’s oil. Transits remain roughly two-thirds below pre-war levels, and the Houthi blockade of Saudi-linked shipping since July has also cut traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb. Developing countries are paying the heaviest price at the pump. Europe has been hit hard as well. European gas prices more than doubled in the first weeks of the war, and Chancellor Merz has acknowledged that Germany’s energy prices rose by 40 to 70 per cent.
The 60-day ceasefire mediated by Pakistan in June lapsed in August without a peace agreement, the US naval blockade of Iran’s ports continues, and attacks on shipping in the Strait reached a new peak in October. The war is in a lull, not yet at an end.
If Trump were to resume full-scale war against Iran, the negative consequences would be huge for the world. We know that Iran has the capacity to wreak havoc on Middle East energy infrastructure, and its commanders have announced a doctrine of striking bases in neighboring countries used for attacks on Iran. Israel’s security would be jeopardised. The risk of nuclear escalation would become real. And most likely Trump would be impeached by the new Democratic House of Representatives.
For India, which imports most of its oil and much of it from the Gulf, the priority must be diplomacy to end the war, together with diversified supplies and a faster shift to renewable energy, which would protect India’s economy from such shocks in the future. India’s accelerated investment in solar power is not only a climate policy. It is also a security policy.
Can Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 succeed amid regional instability, oil-market uncertainty and rising security costs? Is the Gulf's ambition to diversify away from oil economically sustainable without a stable regional security architecture?
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 depends on attracting foreign investment, tourism, and skilled people, and all of these require peace. Saudi Arabia has suffered massively from this war and from its bet on U.S. security. Iranian missiles and drones struck Saudi oil facilities and cities, the Houthis have blockaded Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, and the kingdom’s American security partner was unable to protect it.
The diversification away from oil is economically sound and necessary. Saudi Arabia can decarbonise its own electricity cheaply and become a major exporter of solar power, but only through a regional grid, and a regional grid requires peace. Water, not capital, is the binding constraint, since the fossil aquifers that supply most Saudi irrigation are being depleted.
Vision 2030 can therefore succeed only if Saudi Arabia’s security rests on agreements with its neighbors, including Iran, rather than on a distant patron. The China-brokered Saudi-Iran agreement of 2023 pointed the way. It should be revived and extended into a Gulf-wide security framework under UN auspices.
Donald Trump 2.0 has been a major disruption for the world order. Will the disruption caused by Trump's foreign and economic policies outlast his presidency? Is the American-led global order giving way to a genuinely multipolar world? What role do you see India play in shaping this emerging order rather than merely adapting to it?
The US global order is giving way to a lesser role for the United States under any circumstances, whoever succeeds Trump. America is overstretched, and its shares of world output, trade, finance, military capacity, and technology have all diminished.
In 1950, the United States and the countries that now make up the European Union produced roughly half of world output. Today, at purchasing-power parity, the United States produces about 14 per cent and the EU about 13 per cent, while the emerging and developing economies produce about 60 per cent and are home to 85 per cent of the world’s people. China’s manufacturing output is now roughly double that of the United States. America must learn to live as one among many nations, no longer the world’s dominant power. That is a major psychological and geopolitical change, and that is why the United States is resisting it.
Trump’s disruptions are less a cause of this change than a symptom of it. Historian Paul Kennedy called the pattern imperial overstretch: a leading power’s military commitments come to exceed the economic base that sustains them, and the effort to defend a declining position hastens the decline. Brown University’s Costs of War project puts the US budgetary cost of the wars since 2001 at about $8 trillion, and none of those wars achieved its aims. The voters’ rejection of the Iran war in this month’s midterm elections shows that the American people are ready for a more modest role, even if the foreign-policy establishment is not.
India should help to shape the new order rather than merely adapt to it. It can do so by championing reform of the United Nations, joining the UN Security Council as the 6th permanent member, cooperating with all the other great powers, and promoting the role of the Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs) in global governance. India’s long tradition of non-alignment gives it the standing to argue for a world of cooperation among many powers rather than domination by any one of them.